The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle
A.K. Goldsworthy W hat actually happened when two armies of Greek hoplites met on the battlefield in the sixth to fourth centuries Bc? How and why did one phalanx prevail over another composed of similarly equipped hoplites? These questions are not new, but they have received considerable attention in the current resurgence of interest in the warfare between the city states of Classical Greece. This trend has produced a great number of highly innovative studies which have added enormously to our understanding of the subject.1 No other period of the military history of the ancient world has yet received comparable attention. Alongside these refreshingly new approaches to Greek warfare has come the almost uniform restatement of an old idea. This concerns the othzsmos, or shoving', the term used sometimes by Greek historians to describe the decisive combat in a battle. I hope to show in this article that the traditional understanding of this term does not fit the ancient evidence for what happened in hoplite battles.2
The orthodox view of the othismos sees the clash between two phalanxes as a gigantic pushing match. The opposing hoplites charged at a run, crashing into the enemy front rank. If one side did not collapse as a result of this clash, then the men in the ranks behind the first pressed their broad shields against the back of the man in front and pushed him 2 A.K. Goldsworthy forward. The combined physical thrust of one densely packed mass of men was opposed by the thrust of the enemy phalanx. Eventually, one side was forced back and its formation collapsed, the hoplites perhaps being literally knocked over and trampled. There was little or no actual fighting after the initial, very brief clash of spears. The shoving was decisive. A hoplite battle was literally a struggle of mass against mass. This is the view put forward by V.D. Hanson in what is by far the most detailed and best examination of hoplite warfare yet published.3 No Greek historian explicitly tells us that the othismos involved all ranks packing together in a united push forward to drive the enemy back physically. However, a hoplite phalanx was always deployed with a number of ranks behind the first. It was very rare for a phalanx to be less than eight deep, and much deeper formations were not uncommon. Therefore the majority of hoplites were unable to reach the enemy with their spears. They might have been able to finish off fallen enemies with the butt spikes of their spears, and certainly gave moral support to the front rank men doing the actual fighting, but they cannot have inflicted any significant damage upon the enemy.4 If the othismos was a massed shove, then it would seem to explain the presence of these, otherwise largely superfluous, men on the battlefield. This is the basic argument of the most recent restatement of the traditional view by R.D. Luginbill.5 The need to explain the role of the rear ranks of a phalanx has been a major factor in the development of the idea of massed shoving. This can be seen in an extract from an examination of hoplite battle by J.K Anderson:
When the front rank on either side met, the men behind them did not stand waiting for their leaders to be killed before taking their places; still less did the front rank men fight for a time and then fall back to the rear to give someone else a turn. The rear ranks closed up, and when we read of one Greek army pushing another back (Thuc. Anderson did not believe that the failure of our sources to mention this role of the rear ranks weakened this interpretation:
The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle 3 When, therefore, Xenophon, for instance, makes no express mention of their rear ranks in his account of the struggle at Coronea, I believe it is because he assumed that everyone would understand what they were doing, not because they were disengaged while their leaders struck shield against shield, pushed, fought, killed, and were killed.7
For British scholars there has always been a clear mental parallel between the massed shove of the othismos and a scrummage in a game of rugby football. As J. Lazenby noted, none of the earlier sources gives any clear indication how the "shoving" was accomplished, but Thucydides, in saying of the Thebans at Delion, that "they followed up little by little as they shoved", makes it sound very like the inexorable "heave" of a well drilled pack on the rugby football field. The famous story of a Epameinondas' cry for " one more pace" at Leuktra (Polyaenus 2.3.2) also sounds like the kind of thing the leader of a rugby "pack" might shout.8
The notion is superficially an attractive one. It is very hard for those of us who have never experienced a battle, let alone hand-to-hand fighting, to imagine what close combat was actually like. Yet everyone knows what a rugby scrum looks like, and many of us have played the game, if only at school. However, any similarity is more apparent than real. The difference in scale is enormous. A pack of forwards in rugby consists of eight men in three ranks, while a hoplite phalanx consisted certainly of hundreds of men, often of thousands, and sometimes of tens of thousands. Rugby forwards are able to 'bind' with the men on either side, and grip firmly onto the man ahead. In this way they concert their push forward and support themselves. Hoplites cannot have held onto each other to maintain their balance. A man might have leaned his shield hard against the man in front and have had the shield of the man behind rammed against his own back to provide a precarious balance, but he cannot have gained any physical support from the men on either side. Even if a phalanx battle was a shoving contest, it will have borne little resemblance to a scrummage, and the mechanics of rugby are of no relevance to its study.
There has been some criticism of the traditional view of the othismos, mostly by scholars who portray a hoplite battle as far more open, and composed of a series of individual duels.9 G.L. Cawkwell argued that the massed, close order shoving occurred only after a period of loose order duelling.10 P. Krentz denied the very existence of a massed shove, and saw battles as hand-to-hand contests between the opposing front ranks, with each man in these ranks having sufficient space to fight." For these scholars the rear ranks sewed as replacements for casualties, or might filter forward into the fighting to relieve weary combatants.
These suggestions provoked strong and surprisingly passionate criticism from scholars who emphasized that our sources clearly considered the phalanx to be a close-order formation.12 This is the clear inference from such passages as the speech of Brasidas contrasting Illyrian and Greek methods of fighting (Thuc. 4.126) . However, it is far less clear just how close together Greek hoplites had to be in order to consider themselves to be in close formation.13 This is a question I shall return to later.
The debate, over the question of how open the formation of the hoplite phalanx was, has tended to obscure the valid criticism of the traditional view of the othismos made by the advocates of loose-order duelling. Cawkwell pointed out that, had the rear ranks all been pushing hard with their shields at the men in front, then the opposing front ranks would have been pressed so closely together that they could not have used their weapons, as our sources make clear that they did.14 He also noted that there are many references to battles lasting 'a long time' or most of the day'. It would have been physically impossible for men either to push or to fight without a rest for much more than a few minutes.15
Krentz has argued that there is no good reason to interpret othismos literally in all cases.16 The verb otheo and its compounds, which appear more frequently than the noun in battle descriptions, convey much the same meaning as expressions like 'pushed back' or 'forced back' in an account of a modern battle. The Greek historians inherited these terms from Homer, who described loose-order combat which definitely did not involve massed shoving, and use them in the context of naval as well as land battles. This does not suggest that the meaning of these terms was always literal, or indeed incompatible with the fairly open order advo- Yet, the advocates of massed shoving have failed to demolish these objections to their theory. The proponents of a series of loose-formation duels have also been unable to prove their case. An alternative model for the nature of hoplite battle is required. One of the most pressing needs is to explain the role of the rear ranks and the reason why deep phalanxes were so often successful. I believe that the key to the problem is to explore two factors, both of which have been largely ignored in the past. The first of these is the practical difficulty of moving large numbers of men as a group across even the flattest battlefield. The second factor is even more vital to understanding any type of battle, namely the morale of the participants.20 Too often in the past morale has been relegated to a minor role in hoplite battle. Even Hanson, who gives far greater attention to morale than any previous study, often fails to carry arguments to their logical conclusion.21 This is not a fault unique to those studying Greek warfare, but common to much of military history.22 By re-examining the primary accounts in the context of these factors I hope to present a more convincing picture of hoplite battle, and to demonstrate that these encounters did not involve massed shoving.
Before moving on to discuss these points, it is worth noting that it cannot be argued that close combat was a matter of massed shoving in any other period of military history, including those when armies were 17 Hoplite Battles ', n. 26, citing Riad 8. 295, 336; 12. 420; 13. 148; 16. 44; 654; 17. 274 Holmes, Firing Line, (London, Penguin, 1987 and faster runners will have pulled away from the weaker and slower.
The varying weight of equipment carried by each individual and, even more, the wide variety of ages amongst the hoplites in most phalanxes added to this loosening of ranks. At this stage in a battle the hoplites of a phalanx cannot have been that closely packed. The precise distance that a phalanx advanced at the run is seldom mentioned by our sources.
At Coronea, the Thebans broke into a run when the opposing armies were 200 yards apart. One contingent in the Spartan line, the remnants of the Ten Thousand, began to run when the distance had narrowed to 100 yards, and routed the enemy in front of them. The phalanx facing the other Spartan units collapsed into rout before the Spartans had begun to charge, which suggests that the latter were waiting for the enemy to come even closer before they began to run (Xen. HelL 4. 3.17).
There were not only physical factors affecting the behaviour of the phalanx at this stage of a battle, but also psychological ones. the most famous of these is explained by Thucydides:
It is true of all armies that, when they are moving into action, the right wing tends to get unduly extended and each side overlaps the enemy's left with its own right. This is because fear makes every man want to do his best to find protection for his unarmed side in the shield of the man next to him on the right, thinking that the more closely the shields are locked together, the safer he will be. The fault comes originally from the man on the extreme right of the front line, who is always trying to keep his own unarmed side away from the enemy, and fear spreads to the others who follow his example.
(Thuc. 5. 71).
Drifting to the right must have been made even more attractive to the men on the extreme right of a phalanx when it offered the opportunity of avoiding contact with the enemy altogether. This general veering towards the right occurred along with the tendency of individuals, discussed already, to diverge from a straight advance. It will have been more marked when the phalanx was advancing at a walk. It would have been The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Batde 1I1 very difficult for a running man to gain much shelter from his neighbour's shield, since the front rank must have become very ragged.
Thucydides explained the tendency of phalanxes to drift to the right as the result of each man's fear of being wounded. In this case, the hoplite's fear of personal injury overcame his interest in the success of the army, and left the men on the extreme left of the army exposed. Hanson has described brilliantly the nervous state of the rival phalanxes in the period before, and in this first stage, of a hoplite battle.< As soon as an army began to advance the tension can only have increased, each hoplite wishing to get the whole thing over with. This, rather than any practical benefit, explains the tendency of armies to run 100-200 yards to meet the enemy. A much shorter run would have sufficed to grant maximum impetus to a spear thrust. A long run caused the phalanx to break up. It was also very tiring for men dressed in the weight of the hoplite panoply under the heat of the Greek sun. The loosening of the formation carried the greatest potential risk, especially to phalanxes formed only a few ranks deep. As the hoplites spread out, each individual was granted far more freedom of movement than when he was enclosed in closely packed ranks. In a close-packed phalanx a man had less opportunity to slip away. If he did so, his lack of courage was known to everyone and his shame accompanied him back to his community. When men were scattered it was much easier to slip away. Movement and disorder in the ranks were 12 A.K. Goldsworthy clear signs that a phalanx was on the verge of collapse (Thuc. 5. 10). It has often been pointed out that scattered hoplites were highly vulnerable to attacks by cavalry and light troops, neither of which could seriously threaten a phalanx in open country."45 Xenophon argued that the bravest men should be placed at the front and rear of a phalanx, so that the remaining hoplites in the middle could be 'led by the former and pushed by the latter' (Mem. 3. 1. 8). This has often been taken as clear evidence that a battle was decided by massed shoving, the rear ranks packing down behind those in front.46 Yet Xenophon does not imply that the front rank of bold men needed to be, or was, pushed by all the men behind. Rather, the rear rank of reliable men, by their physical presence, prevented the men in the middle from fleeing and forced them to continue to advance, whilst those in front set an example and led them on. One point that does deserve far more emphasis is his assumption that the less confident men would be in a clear majority in any phalanx and the boldest hoplites a minority. The reluctant majority needed to be both led and driven into battle.
According to Polybius, the men in the rear ranks of a Macedonian phalanx 'by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge add to its force' (Polybzus 18. 30. 4). This comment concerns expressly ranks 6-16, not 2-5, whose pikes projected in front of the formation as we have seen earlier. A similar role is given to the rear ranks of the Hellenistic phalanx by the writers of military manuals (Asclepiodotus 5.2; Arrian Tac. 12. 10; Aelian Tac. 14. 6). Macedonian pikemen did not carry the broad, concave hoplite shield which, it has been argued, was so suited to pushing the man in front.47 None of these authors implies that the main force of a charge was the physical thrust of its combined ranks. The role of the rear ranks was to support the men who fought the enemy, and also to prevent them from running away. In Hellenistic armies the men at the head and rear of a file were chosen from the most reliable, and received higher pay (Asclepiodotus 3. 2-5). In the Roman imperial army the opti ones were positioned behind the line, ready to use their long hastile staffs to drive back to their places any man attempting to flee.t8
In most eighteenth-and nineteenth-century European armies a row of sergeants and NCOs was stationed at the back of a unit to prevent men from running away or hanging back. They were often armed with halberds or pikes, weapons of negligible use in the warfare of the period, The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle 13 which were used to push reluctant soldiers onwards.'9 Battles in this period were most certainly not massed shoving matches. In his account of the fictional battle of Thymbara, Xenophon has the Persians not only place reliable men at the front and back of each formation but also station a separate row of courageous men behind the entire army. These were ordered either to force deserting men to return to the fighting or to kill them (Xen. Cyr. 3. 3. 41-2; 6. 3. 27). Herodotus' description of the rear ranks of the Persian infantry at Thermopylae, having to be whipped into advancing into contact with the Greeks, reflects Greek contempt for cowardly barbarians (Hdt 7. 223). It was also an acknowledgement of the great fear of close combat, something understood by the Greeks. It was a source of pride that they had no need to employ such extreme measures themselves.
A HelL 4. 3. 17) . The further a phalanx charged, the looser and more ragged its formation became and the less able it was to stand up to an attack. At Cunaxa the Ten Thousand began an orderly advance, singing the Paian, when the armies were still 600-800 yards apart. Suddenly, one part of the phalanx began to run, apparently without anyone ordering it to do so. This section surged ahead and the rest started to run to keep up. The Paian was replaced by less united yelling of the war-cry. After the Persians had broken before the Greeks came within bow-shot, the Ten Thousand continued to advance, the hoplites calling out to each other not to run too fast, but to keep together (Xen. Anab. 1. 8). This attack was not a highly ordered affair. The instinctive urge of hoplites was to break into a run and get the battle over with.
This was difficult to check, even though it posed a threat to the vital integrity of the phalanx.
The running charge of the Athenian army at Marathon achieved legendary status (Hdt 6.112 ). The precise distance the charge covered is less important than the deliberate decision to advance at a run.52 This sewed the practical purpose of minimizing the number of arrows the Persians were able to fire at the chargers, a tactic later employed by the Romans (Plutarch, Lucullus 28). It did mean that the Athenian phalanx lost its order, the individual hoplites becoming scattered. On the flanks the Athenians were formed up deeply, but in the centre their line was thin. When the armies met, the flanks drove back the Persians, but in the centre the Greeks broke and were pursued by the enemy (Hdt. 6. 115-16). In a shallow formation, especially one whose order had become looser in a charge, it was easy for the majority of less confident men to escape. Xenophon argued that a shallow phalanx ran a great risk of being broken (Xen. Anab. 4. .8. 11). The rear ranks in a deep formation made it harder for the rest of the phalanx to escape. They also looked intimidating to the enemy. There is no precise information concerning the space normally occupied by each hoplite in this period. Later Hellenistic manuals described three different orders, in which the men occupied a frontage of 6 ft, 3 ft (pyknoszs), and 1.5 ft (synaspismos) respectively (Asclepzodotus, 4. 1-3;Arrian, Tac. 11; Aelian, Tac. 11). The synaspzsmos, or 'locked shields', was a defensive formation, only possible for a stationary phalanx, and perhaps only feasible for pikemen rather than spearmen.57
III
The pyknoszs was the standard attack formation (Asclezodotus 4.3). The 53 Kren tz, 'Hoplite Battl es', pp. 54-5. I assum e that th e fi gure of 6 m. War in History 19974 (1) 6 ft spacing was described as 'natural' and so had no special name.
This was not a combat formation, but was the order adopted for a marching column and might be used to deploy an army on the battlefield.58 A somewhat looser formation than that of the drill-square or battlefield was, and is, far more comfortable to march in over any great distance.59 It is difficult to know how appropriate these desriptions of the pike phalanx were for the hoplite period, but at least they suggest a likely upper and lower limit for the normal frontage allotted to hoplites, within the range of 6-3 ft. I suspect that hoplites began a battle about 3 ft apart, which would have given them a feeling of security from the close proximity of their comrades, whilst still allowing a spearman room to fight. During the advance and charge the formation inevitably broke up, creating much wider gaps at some points. 130-3, 16. 215-17) . If, as seems more likely, it refers instead to a man closing with an enemy soldier, it is clear that the poet expected him to have enough room to fight with spear or sword. Avoiding close combat altogether seems to have been an option for the warriors addressed in these poems.69 Emphasis on his proximity to the enemy might simply have been intended to emphasize the courage of a man willing to risk injury in hand-to-hand combat, rather than fighting from a safer distance.
At Thermopylae, Herodotus tells us that there was a fierce 'shoving' over the body of Leonidas. The Persians were forced back four times before the Greeks were able to drag the body away (Hdt. 7. 225). Earlier in the passage we are told that the Spartans were now fighting with swords because most of their spears were broken (Hdt. 7. 224). At Plataea, 'the battle waxed fierce by the temple of Demeter itself, and continued for a long time until they came to pushing back the barbarians, who were laying hold upon the Greek spears and breaking them off. The Persians' equipment was inferior to that of Greeks, and The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle 19 they also attacked in an uncoordinated manner, charging out 'singly and in tens or groups great and small ' (Hdt. 9. 62 ). This is not a description of a massed shoving match. Would the battle have been described as so fierce if it had been a shoving contest between a massed phalanx and a mixture of individuals and small groups? Surely the Persians would have been easily pushed back or knocked over had this been the case. Even if the Perdians carried shields by this stage of the battle, these were not suited to a pushing match.70
At Delium, the Athenian and Boeotian centre met in stubborn fighting and 'pushing of shields ' (Thuc. 4. 96. 2). The Athenians broke through on the right, but on the left the 25-deep Theban phalanx was more successful and pushed the Athenians back 'step by step' (Thic. (1) vidual men in the front rank striking opponents with their shields, seeking to unbalance them or knock them over, so that they could be more easily killed with spear or sword.71 The 'shoving of shields' was a part of hand-to-hand combat, not an alternative to it. It was a method requiring great aggression, a way of barging into an enemy phalanx in an effort to begin its collapse. It was also a dangerous method, as the attacking hoplite risked losing his own balance. The ranks behind the first were not involved in this. There were no separate phases of fighting and shoving. The only way to break a phalanx was for hoplites to fight their way into it.
Hoplite battles were sometimes over before the two sides met, or after only a brief m0l6e.72 Alternatively a battle could go on for a long time. Thucydides claimed that 'the Spartans will fight for a long time, stubbornly holding their ground until the moment they have put the enemy to flight ' (Thuc. 5. 73. 4 This needed to be nurtured and encouraged. If enough were willing to keep on attacking as the battle wore on and exhaustion set in, then the enemy would crack in the end. The importance of individual aggression is emphasized in Tyrtaeus' exhortation for men to fight at the front and get close to the enemy (Frag. 11. 4, (11) (12) , and in the comment of the fabled Spartan mother than the short sword became effective if a man was willing to add a pace to it (Plutarch, Mor. 217E; cf. 241F).77 The willingness to get close and strike the enemy with the shield was another indication of aggression. The occurrence of lulls in the fighting will also help to explain some of the anecdotes concerning Greek commanders, moving along the line and exhorting their men during a battle.7
Battles could be long-drawn-out, the long pauses being punctuated by brief flurries of fierce fighting. Casualties of 5 per cent to the victorious phalanx as a whole become more credible in this context than in a single deadly encounter before the shoving began. The losses must still have been concentrated in the first, and to a lesser extent the second, rank.
(The overall loss of 5 per cent suggests that comparatively few men from the ranks behind these needed to step into the front rank to replace casualties and so become exposed to wounding themselves.) A loss of the equivalent of 40 per cent of the first rank becomes all the more dreadful when it is remembered that this consisted of the best and bravest men in the phalanx. Hoplite', War in History 19974(1) IV I have attempted to show that there is absolutely no foundation for the traditional view that hoplite battles were gigantic pushing matches. There were other reasons why Greek phalanxes had to be formed in depth. A shallow phalanx was of necessity a very wide one unless it was composed of only a few men. Such a formation would have had difficulty advancing in a battle without losing its order. When it charged the men would have spread out, allowing the less confident majority of hoplites to refuse combat. An enemy charge would have easily broken such a phalanx, because these men were able to flee. A deeper, narrower phalanx allowed undrilled hoplites to advance and still retain a degree of cohesion in their formation. The rear ranks gave more force to the charge because they prevented the less confident men from fleeing, even when the formation began to spread out as the men ran towards the enemy. When the fighting began, the ranks behind the second held the men in front in their places. The longer a phalanx could stay on the field and not break into panic, the greater its chance of victory.
The ranks behind the second in a phalanx did not fight and they did not push. Their role in a battle was essentially passive, but it was vital. Without their physical presence the front ranks would have been unable in the first place to close with the enemy and then to go on fighting for long enough to persuade the opposing phalanx to flee. It was the deep formation of the phalanx that, as much as anything else, allowed hoplites to fight in a different way from the heroes of Homer. The success of the phalanx depended on both the active role of the men fighting in the front and second rank, and the more passive participation of the ranks behind. The rear ranks, simply by staying where they were, prevented the escape of the men in front and gave the phalanx staying power. Merely forcing the front rank to stay in position did not ensure the defeat of the enemy. The hoplites in the front rank needed the bravery and aggression to keep on attacking the enemy until he finally broke. The othismos seems to have been a term to describe this type of stubborn, determined fighting. The phalanx was a massed formation deriving strength from the behaviour of all its members, but it was not a solid, human battering-ram in which individuals were of no importance. The way to understand the phalanx, and the battlefield tactics of any other period, is to study the collective and individual morale of the men composing it.
In conclusion, it is worth considering the merits of one of the deepest formations recorded in our sources, the 50-rank Theban phalanx at Leuctra (Xen. HelL 6. 4. 12). A phalanx of this depth had thus a relatively narrow frontage. This meant that it could advance far more quickly, whilst retaining its order, than a shallower, wider formation. It may be that later accounts of Epaminondas' echeloned advance at Leuctra described not a deliberate ploy, but the inevitably faster War in History 19974 (1) 
